THE INTERVENTION IN LIBYA: LEGAL CONSIDERATIONS AND THE FIRST DECADE AFTER GADDAFI

Abstract

The 2011 international intervention in Libya constitutes a pivotal case in contemporary debates on the use of force, humanitarian intervention, and the Responsibility to Protect (R2P). Authorized by United Nations Security Council Resolutions 1970 and 1973, the intervention was justified as a necessary measure to prevent imminent mass atrocities against civilians, particularly in the city of Benghazi. While the operation was widely regarded as legally grounded and normatively legitimate in its initial phase, its long-term consequences have generated sustained legal, political, and ethical controversy. This article provides a comprehensive analysis of the Libyan intervention by examining its legal basis, operational implementation, and the first decade following the collapse of the Gaddafi regime. It argues that although the intervention likely succeeded in averting an immediate humanitarian catastrophe, it failed to ensure sustainable post-conflict stabilization. The absence of a coherent strategy for institutional reconstruction, security sector reform, and political reconciliation contributed to prolonged state fragmentation, civil conflict, and regional destabilization, particularly in the Sahel. By situating the Libyan case within broader debates on R2P and collective security, the article highlights the risks associated with ambiguous Security Council mandates and premature international disengagement. It concludes that future humanitarian interventions must integrate a robust “Responsibility to Rebuild” in order to reconcile civilian protection with long-term peace and governance.