

"NECESSARY CRIME" AND ILLEGAL MARKETS. A POLITICAL PERSPECTIVE

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Abstract: *This work explores the intricate relationship between power mechanisms and social exclusion processes, shedding light on the shifting spatial dynamics of deviance. It building on current management practices, it hypothesizes the existence of a latent social and institutional mechanism through which deviance and certain types of criminality (Necessary crime) are confined to specific spaces, referred to as "Interdiction areas."—These areas, whether embedded in the urban fabric (Shadow Space) or at its margins (No Law Zone), tolerate a range of deviant behaviors (such as prostitution) and illicit economic activities (such as drug trafficking), which, for ethical or legal reasons, cannot be negotiated openly, but they do exist because there is still significant demand for the services they offer. These areas, which are publicly condemned and strongly opposed in the collective imagination, are in fact tolerated and represent the hidden side of the city—the unspoken and repressed shadow. Their existence serves a paradoxical function: maintaining the illusion of moral integrity and adherence to societal norms.*

Keywords: *No law zone, Shadow Space, social control, criminality, deviance, city, economic, illegal market*

1. Introduction

Our hypothesis is that the space serve as an element of segregation and marginalization of deviance, albeit in a new form: through what we have defined as "*Interdiction Areas*," which can take on the characteristics of either a "*Shadow Space*" or a "*No Law Zone*". These areas of exclusion are situated either within or at the fringes of the "*light zone*," the dominant part of the city that forms the *structural framework* and establishes the normative and semantic codes of urban standardization. It is within this context that the mechanisms directing deviance toward these "interdiction areas" emerge.

These spaces, shaped by both centrifugal and centripetal forces, serve not only to confine deviants but also to facilitate forms of criminality known as "*Necessary crime*." These crimes address specific social needs, meeting a significant internal demand from the "*light zone*".

A key issue lies in understanding the mechanism behind this spatial confinement of deviance. We propose that a distinctive form of dynamic social control, which we term "*liminal*," is at work. This control seeks to contain or channel deviant and criminal activities into these designated urban areas. It operates along the "*fault lines*" that separate these spaces from the surrounding urban environment, known as the *light zone*. With this term, we refer to the dominant part of the city the "*normal*" city, the city for everyone. This is the structure of the

city scaffolding, which develops the normative and semantic codes of *city standardization*, from which the mechanism pushing deviance toward the *interdiction areas* whether *Shadow spaces* or *No-law zones* originates.

The spatial confinement of deviance and *Necessary Crime Interdiction areas* is not a result of intentional, overt political or institutional decisions. Rather, it operates through an automatic mechanism of expulsion facilitated by both formal and informal social control. This process involves various actors, including institutional bodies such as courts and law enforcement, as well as other social entities within the *light zone*. Together, they ensure that excess deviance and necessary crime are effectively channeled into these designated *Interdiction areas*.

According to our model, however, social control, which drives deviance in these areas, assumes distinctive characteristics that differentiate it from "classic" control. Traditionally, classic control aims to prevent and suppress deviance by stigmatizing specific and "selected" behaviors, whereas the social control in these areas functions differently, as we will explore further.

What we seek to describe here is a specific approach to control that functions not merely to dissuade certain behaviors through prevention and repression, but rather to direct these behaviors and activities to specific areas, termed "*Interdiction areas*" while keeping them away from others, which we refer to as the "*Light Zone*".

This aim is achieved through a dynamic mechanism that directs deviant behaviors from the *light zone* into the *Interdiction areas*.

We refer to this type of social control as "dynamic liminal". This approach operates by channeling deviant behaviors into designated "*Interdiction areas*", while simultaneously preventing such behaviors, along with *Necessary crimes*, from spreading beyond these areas.

The concept of dynamic liminal control refers to a specific mode of social control exerted primarily at the "fault lines", the physical and symbolic boundaries that separate *Interdiction areas* from the rest of the city, or the *light zone*. We found the term "liminal" most suitable for describing the functioning of the type of social control we have identified. The Latin adjective *liminaris*, derived from *limen-mĭnis* (threshold), is used, particularly in a figurative sense, to denote the interface of separation between two parts.

2. *Interdiction areas* and localization of deviance

The hypothesis that *Interdiction areas* function as containment zones for deviant and criminal activities -thereby "purifying" the surrounding *light zone* -is supported by empirical evidence. This theory effectively explains why drug trafficking is concentrated in specific urban areas. For example, in Campania, drug trade is predominantly focused in locations such as the "Vele di Scampia" in Naples and the "Parco Verde" in Caivano (located in Italy, Campania Region).

The Parco Verde in Caivano is a challenging subject to describe: it is a site of investigations into drug trafficking and the backdrop of horrific child abuse cases, occurring amidst the anonymous apartment blocks in the north-ern outskirts of Naples. This enclave of disadvantage, poverty and marginalization, a stark example of a No-law zone, is home to approximately 6,000 people who are effectively removed from society and institutions. The camorra controls the area, and drug trafficking is the predominant criminal activity, though other forms

of crime, such as theft, robbery, and extortion, are also present. Consequently, this area has become one of Italy's most significant drug trafficking hubs, off-limits to firefighters, postal workers, and even police force.

More broadly, this hypothesis also helps explain why prostitution is often confined to specific urban areas, frequently in a state of semi-obscurity, and why undocumented or irregular immigrants tend to settle predominantly in peripheral and degraded neighborhoods (such as Castel Volturno, located in Italy, Campania Region) rather than in more residential parts of the city.

Our developed thesis posits that there are areas, places, spaces, and niches -both within and beyond urban aggregates- where society and the State "relocate" deviant phenomena and "*Necessary crime*" phenomena through both formal and informal mechanisms. These areas are ones where society and the State cannot ethically, politically, socially, or legally manage or contain these phenomena within their own structures. At the same time, there is a significant internal "demand" for their existence, indicating a complex interplay between the need for such phenomena and the mechanisms designed to push them out of central societal focus.

At the same time, we have explored the "push mechanism" that drives deviance into the "*Interdiction areas*," proposing that it operates in two distinct ways: vertically, from top to bottom, and horizontally, through lateral shifts of deviance towards peripheral areas. The direction of this centrifugal force is influenced by the volume of deviance to be managed. Vertical pushes (which manage smaller amounts of deviance) create what we term a "*Shadow space*." This type of space is relatively concealed and integrates into the social fabric of the *light zone* through significant camouflage. In contrast, horizontal pushes (which address larger quantities of deviance) establish a different type of space: larger and more visible (often but not always) situated on the periphery. These areas can be extensive and densely populated, characterized by a prominent and observable structure (where many legal norms are either ignored or replaced by internal meta-rules). We refer to these as "*No-law zones*."

If deviance exists in excess but remains below a certain threshold, it becomes more concealable and is integrated into the social structure, forming an invisible, subterranean current: a "*Shadow space*".

However, when deviance surpasses this "threshold of tolerance," internal absorption within social structures ceases to be effective for its exclusion and concealment. Instead, a centrifugal mechanism pushes it outward, creating larger and, above all, more visible pockets of deviance and illegality: *No law zones*.

These areas, whether physical or symbolic, vary in size and visibility and are classified as *Areas of Interdiction*. They are not merely new forms of "mobile ghettos" but possess specific "functional specializations."

Within these zones, the State essentially relinquishes much, if not all, of its power and control, not only to accommodate excess deviance but also to permit certain specific illegal activities.

The area of Castel Volturno, in the Province of Caserta (located in Italy, Campania Region), serves as a paradigmatic example of a "*No-law zone*" from this perspective. Despite being portrayed in official narratives - whether political, social, cultural, or media driven - as a high-density immigrant enclave in urgent need of cleanup and effective integration policies, the reality is different. In these areas, the state not only tolerates a range of *Necessary crimes*

but also implicitly delegates the management of vast and lucrative illegal markets to third parties, thereby abdicating its administrative responsibilities.

Areas of Interdiction, however, differ from ghettos, with which they often physically overlap, in that their primary function is not merely to "exclude" but to "conceal and specialize." These areas are designed to facilitate specific activities, whether legal or illegal, that are necessary for the community within the "*light zone*".

Systemically and functionally, the *interdiction area*'s role is to support the effective operation of the manifest area within the *light zone*, which could otherwise be compromised by excessive deviance and the delivery of goods and services that conflict with its legal and social norms.

In our perspective, interdiction areas can be seen as a form of functional specialization where certain areas are designated as deviant and criminal.

These areas, though inherently unavoidable, tend to expand when political decisions criminalize certain activities or when the state refrains from regulating activities with high levels of deviance. Consider, for instance, the sale of narcotics, which is banned by the state and thus 'outsourced' to organized crime, operating within *Interdiction areas*.

It's evident that state-controlled distribution - alongside comprehensive and continuous education and awareness campaigns, especially in schools about the harmful effects of these substances - would dismantle the criminal market and eliminate its concealment within these *Interdiction areas*.

The criminalization of illegal immigration, crucial to agriculture and other economic and support sectors, produces a similar effect: the creation of detrimental 'dual markets' managed by criminal organizations, and the concealment of these individuals in near-slavery conditions within the dark corners of marginalization and shame.

A particularly illustrative example is prostitution, which, while not illegal, is socially stigmatized and remains unregulated by the state. Consequently, it is driven to the fringes, where it is managed brutally by criminal enterprises within these *Interdiction areas*.

3. Legalization, "Zero-tolerance" policies and illegal market

As previously discussed, *Interdiction areas* do not emerge from deliberate or conscious political decisions, but rather from a gradual drift a kind of automatic dynamic process of displacement and exclusion. Political and institutional rhetoric frequently claims a strong commitment to eradicating deviance and criminality from these areas.

While there is a stated intention to address the widespread issues within *Interdiction areas*, this commitment often fails to effect significant change.

Even when institutions undertake decisive actions, these interventions are typically limited in scope and duration, often leading to practical failure.

A striking example is the 1994 initiative in the United States, when New York City Mayor Rudolph Giuliani, of Italian-American heritage, implemented the "Zero Tolerance" policy. This initiative aimed to eradicate all forms of deviance and criminality, regardless of severity, in the city's most troubled areas.

The policy was grounded in the "Broken Windows" theory, introduced in the early 1980s by criminologists George Kelling and James Wilson (Kelling et al., 1982). This theory argued that urban disorder and decay could foster additional criminal behavior by encouraging

antisocial actions. It suggested that maintaining order by addressing even minor offenses, such as vandalism and petty crime, would create a general atmosphere of legality and order, thereby reducing more serious crimes.

Regardless of its empirical support, such theories often resonate strongly with the public. They offer a reassuring narrative that suggests all forms of deviant and criminal behavior can be effectively managed by law enforcement, and that the success of such efforts relies solely on the state's genuine commitment to suppressing these issues.

By implementing appropriate criminal policies, effective intervention strategies, and substantial economic investments, institutions might aim to eradicate all forms of deviance and criminality.

The hypothesis underlying our theory, in contrast, is based on a fundamentally different idea, one that is less optimistic, reassuring, and appealing.

We argue that not all crimes are fully prosecutable or eradicated. Specifically, regarding what we term "*Necessary Crime*," the state often adopts policies of substantial tolerance or, at best, limited and localized repression.

To clarify, as introduced in the preface, "*Necessary Crime*" refers to a category of offenses that serve specific social needs. These crimes involve goods or services with high demand and are situated within economies that are more or less overtly criminal in nature.

The term "illegal economy," in which *Necessary Crime* constitutes a small part, encompasses a broad spectrum of illicit economic activities.

The heterogeneity of phenomena encompassed within the broad category of "illegal markets" can be systematically categorized into five distinct types: a) the first type involves the exchange of goods or services that are inherently prohibited, such as drugs, child pornography, and underage prostitution. Due to these prohibitions, the goods, their subsequent trade, and consumption (even though drug consumption in Italy is not classified as a criminal offense but rather an administrative sanction) are all banned. Consequently, transactions involving these products create distinct markets that are rigidly separated from the legal economy; b) It refers to products obtained Illegally: This type involves products that are legally permissible in themselves but have been acquired through illegal means. The subsequent sale of these products is also illegal due to the illicit manner in which they were obtained. Examples include transactions involving stolen cars or artworks. The sale of such products may occur in separate markets where stolen goods are exchanged, or it may be channeled into legal markets; c) The third type refers to Counterfeit or Forged Products: This type involves products resulting from counterfeiting or forgery. While the act of counterfeiting itself is often not prohibited, the trade of counterfeit goods is illegal. These products constitute a significant portion of illegal transactions and mainly involve counterfeit luxury brand goods and industrial spare parts. This category also includes counterfeit pharmaceuticals, which are estimated to represent between 5% and 7% of the global pharmaceutical market (L. Paoli, K. Feytens, The Belgian and Indian Pharmaceutical Market, Research Outline, Mimeo, 2016). Transactions of these products may occur both in separate illegal markets or within legal circuits; d) Products that are legal in nature but whose trade is prohibited: This category includes goods that are otherwise legal but are banned from trade due to ethical or legal reasons. Examples include the trade of human organs and surrogate motherhood (which is banned in some countries). These markets are often referred to as "repugnant" or "harmful" (D. Satz, Why Some Things Should Not Be for Sale:

The Moral Limits of Markets, Oxford University Press, USA, 2010; P. Steiner, M. Trespeuch, *Marchés contestés: Quand le marché rencontre la morale*, Presses Universitaires du Midi, 2015). Even if such activities were legalized, the transactions involving these "products" would still be considered morally offensive, and thus often occur separately from the legal economy; e) the fifth type deals with illegal markets involving legally permissible products with regulatory violations. This type involves the production, trade, and consumption of goods that are legal in principle, but where actors violate regulations or laws during production or sale. Examples include smuggling cigarettes to evade taxes and trading weapons without a state license. This category is complex and likely very common, as violations can take many forms and legal and illegal aspects are often closely intertwined (F. Wehinger, *Illegale Märkte: Stand der sozialwissenschaftlichen Forschung*, MPIfG Working Paper 11/6, Max Planck Institute for the Study of Societies, Germany, 2011; J. Beckert, F. Wehinger, *In the Shadow: Illegal Markets and Economic Sociology*, in *Socio-Economic Review* 11, 2013). Violations may relate to production processes (e.g., labor or environmental laws), product characteristics (e.g., safety standards), transactions (e.g., trading licenses), or third-party rights (e.g., tax obligations or royalties). Some illegal products, like child pornography or the sale of hard drugs and protected species, provoke a strong and immediate moral aversion from the public, regardless of legal penalties. Conversely, some illicit goods and services are met with less hostility because they are rooted in tradition or perceived as socially valuable. Examples of more tolerated illegal markets include the sale of counterfeit clothing, music piracy, smuggled cigarettes, and soft drugs. This aspect is significant because social reactions have important consequences, influencing state responses to transactions and products. The state reacts differently to strongly opposed products compared to those perceived as more "legitimate" and tolerated. Additionally, markets rarely operate entirely outside the legal realm; more often, they exist in a gray area, a limbo between legality and illegality (F. Wehinger, *Illegale Märkte*, op. cit.).

More specifically, this can include both the case when the activity, product, or service offered is classified as *contra legem* by the legal system and the legitimate activities conducted illegally that is when otherwise lawful activities, goods, or services are carried out in ways that violate criminal laws.

Additionally, there are borderline activities, such as prostitution. In some countries, prostitution is considered illegal, unlike in Italy where it is permitted but regulated. In Italy, while the practice itself is legal, its exploitation and facilitation by third parties are prohibited under laws such as the "Merlin Law" (Law No. 75 of 1958) and the subsequent "Law No. 269 of 1998.

Typically, the illegal market emerges and solidifies where the state prohibits the trade of certain goods or where it appropriates them. This often occurs in totalitarian regimes (such as the post-war USSR or contemporary North Korea) or when goods and services are extremely scarce, as seen during wars and famines.

Structurally, the illegal market functions much like legal markets but has distinct differences due to its clandestine nature. These differences include the lack of formal transaction venues, absence of legal advertising, and the inability to seek judicial recourse. In illegal economies, which involve the trade of prohibited goods and services, accurate data on the market size, product quality, or the reliability of involved actors is often unavailable (Rey, 1993).

The study of economic activities outside the legal framework is well-established in sociology. In addition to the classic research from the Chicago School, scholars like Howard Becker (1963), Sudhir Venkatesh (2013), Keith Hart (1973), Manuel Castells (1989), and Saskia Sassen (1984) have made significant contributions to understanding illegal markets. Their works are essential for a thorough exploration of the subject. As Durkheim and Weber have pointed out, the state plays a pivotal role in not only shaping legal markets but also in defining and structuring illegal ones. The distinction between what is deemed illegal and what is permitted is established by state legal norms: in essence, "illegality" is not an inherent quality but a "designation" (Bergeron et al., 2014:121).

The decision to criminalize specific behaviors, thus influencing the nature of permissible exchanges of goods and services, is embedded in a broader social and political context. This decision is influenced by the cultural and ethical values of the society in question. For example, the regulation of prostitution, alcohol, and drugs illustrates how cultural and social factors shape legality. The criminalization and enforcement of these activities by state agencies act as mechanisms of social control, mirroring the prevailing cultural and ethical values of the society.

Consequently, changes in the size and structure of illegal markets are intricately linked to the creation and enforcement of criminal laws. As Renate Mayntz points out, the nature and extent of illegal markets are critically shaped by law enforcement activities. While one might expect a purely antagonistic relationship between illegal operators and police forces—given the latter's mandate to combat crime—the reality is often more complex. Corruption within state authorities, who may exploit illegal economies for personal gain, is unfortunately not uncommon (R. Mayntz, *So-ciologia dell'amministrazione pubblica*. La Nuova Scienza, Il Mulino, Bologna, 1982).

A key factor in analyzing these markets is their internal organization. They are not merely composed of technologies, goods, services, competition, and rational actors, but also rely on a set of "norms" that structure and facilitate their operation. These norms include rules of exchange and the roles of various participants.

In this framework, the state plays a pivotal role in shaping the dynamics of illegal markets. Through its regulation and enforcement actions, the State helps manage the uncertainty that characterizes these markets, by the modulation of repressive and control measures. See F. Wehinger, *Fake Qualities: Assessing the Value of Counterfeit Goods*, in J. Beckert and C. Musselin (eds.), *Constructing Quality: The Classification of Goods in Markets*, Oxford University Press, 2013. The most significant differences between legal and illegal markets lie in the role and conduct of the participants. In illegal markets, actors must be prepared to: a) engage in behaviors that violate legal provisions; b) overcome moral reservations due to the illegitimacy of the transaction; c) face potential legal proceedings; d) endure the possible non-enforcement of contracts, lacking the protections of the legal system. An important factor contributing to the instability of illegal markets is the uncertainty and opacity that arises from the inability to transparently communicate the quality and characteristics of the products to consumers. Counterfeit pharmaceuticals are a paradigmatic example of this issue, as buyers have no way of knowing the active ingredients, their quality, or their quantity in the purchased substance. To mitigate transaction risks, actors in illegal markets often rely on relatively primitive tools compared to those used in legal economies. These tools include: a) the "reputation" of

operators, conveyed through personal networks. Although networks also play a significant role in legal markets, their importance is generally more pronounced in illegal ones. In illegal markets, the importance of certain factors is notably pronounced: (M. Granovetter, The Strength of Weak Ties, in *American Journal of Sociology*, 78(6), 1973; B. Uzzi, The Sources and Consequences of Embeddedness for the Economic Performance of Organizations: The Network Effect, in *American Sociological Review*, 61); b) The "Latent Threat of Violence": While illegal markets themselves may not be inherently violent, the underlying threat of potential violent reactions acts as a significant coercive tool. Threat is used to maintain order and compliance within the market; c) "Corruption of State Agents": Corruption allows state agents to benefit from illegal economic activities, either personally or on behalf of the state. In terms of market organization, corruption is also a means to structure competition and maintain market stability by ensuring the state's tolerance of illegal activities. Additional specificities of illegal market organization pertain to the demand side. Since marketing tools to create preferences and loyalty are limited, market formation primarily depends on the supply side (J. Beckert, M. Dewey, *The Architecture of Illegal Markets*, Oxford University Press, U.K., 2017). Finally, the illicit nature and resultant opacity of illegal markets make it challenging to quantify transaction volumes accurately. For example, in the drug trafficking market, data on the number of consumers and consumption habits are generally more reliable than information about suppliers and supply components. Estimations are often based on seizures, which do not reflect actual transaction volumes, and potentially unreliable statements from involved actors. The quantity of imported drugs is estimated by considering the exported quantities and the varying purity of intercepted substances. Estimates of production-related data, such as intermediate costs and value added, are derived indirectly through wholesale and retail trade data. Similarly, estimates for tobacco smuggling are calculated analogously to prostitution markets, using indicators like the smoking population. To estimate the illegal tobacco market, data on consumer habits, similar to those used for controlled substances, are utilized. This estimation approach focuses on the supply side and involves analyzing the quantities of seized goods, disregarding both domestic production and export data. Potential volumes available in the domestic market are calculated using a coefficient that reflects law enforcement's control capabilities, accounting for seized goods, interdicted products, and those merely in transit within the country. The economic value of the market is determined based on the detected quantities and sale prices, which are typically adjusted downward to align with legal product pricing. For the prostitution market, a supply-based estimation method is used. This approach accounts for various types of prostitution, including street-based and indoor services, and differentiates between visible and hidden forms of prostitution. The overall estimate is derived by calculating the number of sex workers (distinguishing between street workers, those operating from apartments, and those in nightclubs), the average value of their services by type, and the average number of services performed per working day.

Illegal markets, as described, are structured and operate within *Interdiction areas*, which encompass activities such as illegal immigration, drug trafficking, prostitution, and other forms of *Necessary Crime*.

These *Interdiction areas*, essential for facilitating illegal economic activities, are numerous and spread across various locations, both within our country and internationally. Every

city or organized human settlement, governed by social rules and legal norms, requires such spaces to function.

For instance, in Campania, consider the previously mentioned area of Castel Volturno. The area of Castel Volturno, in the Province of Caserta, as well as the previously mentioned "Parco Verde" in Caivano, serves as a paradigmatic example of No Law Zones, although in official, political, and social narratives economic, media, and cultural spheres, it is portrayed as a place of extreme marginalization with a high density of illegal immigration, in need of urgent remediation and serious integration policies. It has become a hotspot for uncontrolled, irregular, and illegal immigration, widespread prostitution, drug trafficking, and labor exploitation. While the *light zone* expels deviant and criminal activities it cannot manage through a centrifugal force, *Interdiction areas*, conversely, exert a centripetal force. They attract all forms of deviance and *Necessary Crime*.

The problem here transcends legal and economic issues, such as the creation of dual markets (Piore, 1980); it is primarily an ethical crisis. Such conditions of exploitation are not only legally indefensible but also morally reprehensible to the societies that benefit from them. "Civilized" society must confront the stark and troubling reality that it tolerates forms of modern slavery within its own borders. This includes the exploitation of undocumented immigrants for labor in fruit and vegetable harvesting, as well as the trafficking of young women, often still in their teens, for prostitution.

Conclusions

If we accept the argument that deviance, once it reaches a certain threshold, has triggering and destabilizing effects on the social system - activating automatic mechanisms of control and expulsion - and if we also acknowledge the hypothesis that certain criminal phenomena are "necessary" due to the significant internal demand from the *light zone*, then the sobering conclusion is that completely eradicating *Interdiction Areas* may be an unattainable goal.

Daily experience confirms that when the state attempts to clear an *Interdiction Areas*, whether a *Shadow Space* or a *No Law Zone*, the activities previously conducted there will soon relocate, forming new *Interdiction Areas* elsewhere. The reason lies in the fact that these areas, as extensively discussed, perform an essential function for the light zone by removing excess deviance while providing goods and services—some of which are illegal—that cannot be openly traded but are in significant internal demand. Thus, it is crucial to recognize that *Interdiction Areas*, much like Jungian "Shadows" in analytical theory, represent the repressed elements of the city. They embody everything the city contains and simultaneously rejects, as they evoke guilt, shame, embarrassment, and pain.

These areas are parts of the social space relegated to the hidden, unconscious dimension, alienated from social consciousness, thereby maintaining a false sense of moral integrity within the community. To engage with our socially and urbanistically repressed "Social Shadows", we must begin by reflecting on the symbolic boundaries that separate us from these areas, boundaries that are both physical and conceptual. We need to muster the courage to cross these boundaries, culturally and ethically. Instead of viewing the boundary merely as a line of demarcation that protects us from what is unfamiliar, alien, or deemed not part of us, we should see it as an interface, a communication channel with other parts of ourselves and the surrounding social reality that we are connected to.

Thus, beyond metaphor, a potentially viable solution - though not necessarily a complete one - might be to engage with these areas rather than removing and denying them through ineffective and flawed Zero-tolerance policies.

This could involve decriminalizing certain offenses, such as drug trafficking, by implementing state-controlled distribution systems, and regulating other highly deviant activities like prostitution.

Zero-tolerance policies, which enforce strict measures and coercion, often exacerbate social removal, deviance, and criminal activity. These approaches can inadvertently drive up the prices of illicit goods and services, ultimately bolstering criminal organizations and increasing their power.

Ultimately, since *Necessary Crime* addresses specific social needs and generates illegal economies, the most effective solution to mitigate its impact may involve radical and structural legal reforms. These reforms could include the legalization and regulation of markets currently operating in the shadows, removing them from the control of organized crime, violence, and exploitation. By placing these markets under direct state management, they could be integrated into the social, economic, political, legal, and institutional fabric.

For example, the illegal gambling market was effectively dismantled when the state chose to regulate and manage it directly. Similarly, the problem of illegal alcohol in the United States was resolved not through the futile measures of prohibition - which only fueled the underground market - but through the legalization and regulation of alcohol sales.

In the United States, between 1920 and 1933, the XVIII Amendment, Section I, established: "One year after the ratification of this article and by virtue of it, the manufacture, sale, and transportation of alcoholic beverages for consumption, as well as their importation and exportation to and from the United States and all territories under its jurisdiction, are prohibited." Together with the Volstead Act, this marked the official prohibition of alcohol production, sale, importation, and transportation. Senator Andrew Volstead, the law's sponsor, declared after its enactment: "The slums will soon be a thing of the past. Prisons and reformatories will stand empty. All men will walk upright again, all women will smile, and all children will laugh. The gates of hell have closed for-ever closed forever" (H. G. Levine, C. Reinerman, *Temperance, Prohibition, Alcohol Control*, in www.drugtext.org). However, the outcome of what would go down in history as "Prohibition" was quite different: the day after it took effect, the price of alcohol skyrocketed, leading to the rise of a flourishing black market. The direct consequences of the ban were the appearance of alcohol - often adulterated - on the black market and the resulting criminal trafficking associated with its production and sale. Initially, bottles were sold in general stores, where owners took on the risk in exchange for substantial profits. Later, the so-called speakeasies spread—private clubs requiring a password for entry, where people could drink freely. In 1920, the year Prohibition took effect, there were over 30,000 such establishments in New York City alone. Prohibition also gave rise to the phenomenon known as "gangsterism," with the rise of ruthless crime bosses, among whom the Italian-American Alfonso Capone, or "Al Capone" stood out, making his fortune through the profits of the illegal alcohol trade. Thus, the failure of Prohibition - having caused the rise of criminal organizations and economic damage to the state without reducing alcohol consumption - led to the passage of the XXI Amendment on December 5, 1933, which marked the end of the

Volstead Act. Millions of Americans could once again legally purchase alcohol, now liberalized and taxed, boosting government revenues and creating about one million jobs in the alcohol industry in the following six months. Furthermore, criminal gangs saw their multimillion-dollar business evaporate, significantly weakening their power.

We fully recognize that such measures could never achieve the complete eradication of *Interdiction areas*, as deviance is an inherent feature of every social system, inevitably generating a residual margin of deviant behavior. Moreover, even if eradication were feasible, it might not be entirely desirable. Within certain limits, deviance can have positive effects, contributing to social cohesion and driving the evolution of socio-cultural systems, with significant political and economic repercussions.

Nevertheless, liberalization and countering prohibitionist policies would likely lead to a reduction in both the scope and nature of these areas. This would have the valuable "collateral" effect of facilitating the integration of Social Shadows and addressing the latent issues within our cities and ourselves.

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