

**DOCUMENTARY FRAUD AS SEEN BY THE DOCUMENTARY FRAUD
BUREAU OF THE DIRECTION DE LA POLICE AUX FRONTIERES**

Part II
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Abstract

Today, we are witnessing a globalisation and intensification which is unprecedented in the history of migratory flows in our country. These flows are now of a very complex nature as placed under criminal rule.

With this level of organisation, we are not just trying to counter illegal immigration, but fighting against criminality. In this respect, the use of forged documents or documentary fraud in general is a great boon to the activities of the clandestine networks and constitutes an excellent means of introducing illegal immigrants into Western countries.

Keywords : migratory flows, documentary fraud, illegal immigration pathways

The scale of documentary fraud

The use of statistics concerning documentary fraud has allowed us to discern certain trends for the first half of 2014, particular concerning:

- the types of documents which are most commonly falsified and forged;
- the type of fraud observed;
- the geographical areas in our territory which are most sensitive in this respect;
- the most common issuing countries and the nationalities of the holders.

Ranking by nationality of the holder.

The activism and efficacy of the Chinese networks should be underlined. Despite the fact that a great many of them are in transit towards English-speaking countries, there is substantial use of falsified French documents.

- Chinese from the PRC (512 documents, of which 190 French)
- Algerians (456 documents seized, of which 234 French),
- Sri Lankans (319 documents, of which 20 French),
- Moroccans (271 documents, of which 40 French),
- Nigerians (198 of which 7 French),
- Senegalese (187, of which 40 French),
- Ivory Coast nationals (174, of which 62 French)
- Somalians (141, of which 23 French).

Ranking by issuing country

On the basis of this data (2014) concerning the nationality of the bearer, a second quantitative ranking makes it possible to draw up a list of the issuing countries of documents use, including French documents in particular. Although the fact that the Algerians are at the top of this list by geographical origin of falsified documents is not really a surprise, it is worth noting the positions of the Nigerians, and the Sri Lankans in third position before the

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Moroccans, as they are generally in transit and bear equal numbers of documents from countries where they do not master the language (German, French and Italian).

- The Algerians mainly use French (234) and Italian (149) documents.
- The Chinese nationals stopped in France essentially carry French documents (190) or Chinese (89), North Korean (33), or South Korean (28) ones.
- The Sri Lankans generally use German (26), Italian (23), French (20), or British (13) documents.
- The Moroccans carry Italian (159), French (40), and Spanish (10) documents.
- The Nigerians carry Italian (38), British (36) and French (7) documents.
- The Senegalese use Italian (80) and French (40) documents.
- Nationals of the Ivory Coast (French documents 62).
- Somalians (Netherlands 142), (French 4) .

Ranking according to the type of document.

One may note the predominant position of passports as being the most commonly counterfeit or falsified documents. This is reasonable considering their natural use, for travelling.

1. In this category, passports are the most commonly falsified documents (3424) in all countries taken together.
2. Identity cards (1239) come in second place.
3. Stay or residence permits (648, permanent or temporary).
4. Short stay visas (316).
5. Driving licences (135).
6. Residence cards (125).
7. Refugee cards (74, Convention of 51).
8. Various stamps (58).
9. Temporary residence permits (49).
10. Birth certificates (52).
11. Long-stay consular visas (30).

Types of fraud per type of document.

The following analysis concerns the type of fraud which is used for each type of document. At this stage, this research is liable to interest all agents on the ground by providing them, at a given time, with a general view of the situation with respect to forgeries and other falsifications.

The French passport appears to be the most forged or falsified document, along with the short-stay consular visa and the residence cards. In this field, France is in second position for NICs (behind Italy), and driving licences (also behind Italy). It is in third position for the stay or residence permit (behind Italy and Spain) and the refugee residence permit (behind Belgium and Germany).

Passports: Out of a total of 3,424 passports seized, the following figures have been obtained for the main source countries:

- France: 612 (23 forgeries, 445 falsifications, 97 fraudulent use, 45 fraudulently obtained, 2 documents stolen blank). Moreover, in July 2001 1,300 blank passports were stolen; they have not been counted in the statistics.
- The Netherlands: 224 (141 falsifications, 59 fraudulent use, 14 forgeries, 7 documents stolen blank, 3 obtained fraudulently).
- Spain: 209 (166 falsifications, 38 forgeries, 3 fraudulent use, 1 obtained fraudulently, 1 document stolen blank)./
- Mali: 166 (of which 87 falsifications, 78 fraudulent use, 1 obtained fraudulently).
- United Kingdom: 155 (of which 108 falsifications, 38 fraudulent use, 9 forgeries).

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- Greece: 146 (of which 97 falsifications, 44 forgeries, 4 obtained fraudulently, 1 fraudulent use)
- Italy: 124 (of which 51 falsifications, 36 forgeries, 29 documents stolen blank, 4 obtained fraudulently, 4 fraudulent use).
- Guinea: 113 (of which 89 falsifications, 14 fraudulent use, 7 documents stolen blank, 3 forgeries).
- Malaysia: 99 (of which 54 forgeries, 43 falsifications, 2 fraudulent use).
- China: 90 (of which 63 falsifications, 16 fraudulent use, 10 forgeries, 1 obtained fraudulently).

National identity cards (NIC): Out of a total of 1239 NICs, all countries taken together, the following is obtained:

- Italy: 518 (of which 240 documents stolen blank, 160 falsifications, 81 forgeries, 32 obtained fraudulently, 5 fraudulent use).
- France: 298 (of which 97 falsifications, 90 forgeries, 87 obtained fraudulently, 24 obtained fraudulently).
- The Netherlands: 215 (of which 159 fraudulent use, 34 falsifications, 17 forgeries, 3 obtained fraudulently, 2 documents stolen blank).
- Portugal: 79 (of which 54 forgeries, 20 falsifications, 5 fraudulent use).
- Belgium: 40 (of which 16 fraudulent use, 15 forgeries, 8 falsifications, 1 obtained fraudulently).

Stay or residence permits (permanent or definitive): concern a total of 648 documents, of which in particular:

- Italy: 412 (of which 320 forgeries, 68 falsifications, 16 documents stolen blank, 1 obtained fraudulently, 7 fraudulent use).
- Spain: 75 (of which 50 forgeries, 17 falsifications, 8 fraudulent use).
- France: 46 (of which 19 fraudulent use, 17 forgeries, 8 falsifications, 2 obtained fraudulently).
- Belgium: 33 (of which 22 forgeries, 10 falsifications, 1 documents stolen blank).
- Germany: 29 (of which 18 documents stolen blank, 5 forgeries, 3 falsifications, 3 fraudulent use).
- Morocco: 16 (of which 15 forgeries, 1 fraudulent use).

Short stay consular visas: concern 316 visas, of which in particular:

- France: 93 (of which 81 falsifications, 8 forgeries, 2 obtained fraudulently, 1 document stolen blank, 1 fraudulent use).
- Germany: 66 (of which 33 documents stolen blank, 19 falsifications, 12 forgeries, 2 obtained fraudulently).
- Italy: 40 (of which 21 documents stolen blank, 16 falsifications, 3 forgeries).
- Belgium: 25 (of which 23 falsifications, 2 forgeries).

Driving licences: 135 documents concerned, of which in particular.

- Italy: 45 (of which 32 falsifications, stolen blank 9, forgeries 4).
- France: 32 (of which 12 falsifications, 9 forgeries 8 obtained fraudulently, 2 documents stolen blank, 1 fraudulent use).
- Romania: 6 (of which 5 forgeries and 1 falsification).

Resident's cards: 125 documents concerned, of which in particular.

- France: 71 (of which 41 forgeries, 12 obtained fraudulently, 10 fraudulent use, 8 falsifications).
- Italy: 14 (of which 6 forgeries, 4 falsifications, 3 documents stolen blank, 1 fraudulent use).
- Spain: 12 (of which 5 forgeries, 4 fraudulent use, 3 falsifications).
- Belgium: 10 (of which 4 fraudulent use, 3 forgeries, 3 falsifications).

Refugee residence permits: concern 74 documents:

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- Belgium: 25 (of which 10 falsifications, 8 fraudulent use, 7 forgeries).
- Germany: 17 (of which 8 falsifications, 8 fraudulent use, 1 document stolen blank)
- France: 14 (of which 7 falsifications, 7 fraudulent use)

Finally, this study could not be dissociated from knowledge as to the condition of documentary fraud by geographic sector, and by border in France.

Ranking of documentary fraud by sector.

In this field, the Paris airports are the most sensitive areas, due to the amount of international air traffic. The figures obtained correspond to migratory statistics obtained at the border crossing points which are acknowledged to be sensitive.

Representation by nationality of bearers and by border.

1/ Chinese: 512 bearers for the entire country.

2/ Algerians: 456.

3/ Sri Lankans: 319.

4/ Moroccans: 271.

5/ Malians: 266.

6/ Congolese: 205.

7/ Nigerians: 198.

8/ Senegalese: 187.

9/ Ivory Coast: 174.

10/ Somalians: 173.

11/ Romanians: 167.

12/ Albanians: 161.

13/ Sierra Leon: 141.

14/ Cameroon: 135.

15/ Indians: 133.

Current developments and trends in documentary fraud.

A clear development of offences connected to documentary fraud, both in terms of quantity and quality, is perceptible today, particularly in France but also in most of the Schengen countries. What is more, the characteristics of this development are identical as they are determined by two intrinsic factors:

- the criminalisation of the networks;
- the increase in purchasing power of potential illegal immigrants.

The criminalisation of the networks as main cause for improving quality of forgeries and falsifications.

The criminal organisations which are connected to networks of prostitution, drugs and various forms of trafficking, have adapted themselves, at a lesser risk in criminal law terms, to the possibilities offered by the illegal immigration market.

Characterised by strong economic power and a very flexible structure, they have invested in new imaging technologies.

Thus, in Thailand and Hong Kong, printing works are established which have equipment with a level of performance which is not far from that of the State printers, and allow excellent forgeries.

Therefore, top of the range imaging equipment is available to the networks and allow very high quality forgeries and falsifications to be made.

Finally, the release of programs on the Internet about 6 months ago, allowing the reading, modification and even the production of microchips and holograms, means that new possibilities for fraud may be glimpsed.

Increase in the purchasing power of new illegal immigrants.

Indeed, it seems that although the nationals of the poorest countries, the traditional source of illegal immigration, are ever more numerous in wanting to leave their respective country, their financial means are generally sufficient only to purchase, at the very most, a fairly poor quality falsification, generally by substitution of the identity photograph or partial forgery by photocopying an existing document. It is rare to find a complete forged passport coming from African countries.

However, the situation is very different for immigrants from Asian countries, China in particular. They have a much higher level of purchasing power, especially since they live in a system allowing a sort of medium-term credit. They can therefore be bearers of very good forgeries.

Nonetheless, as the production of forgeries is currently going beyond the cottage-industry stage, costs should fall..

Forgeries and obtaining documents improperly: an adaptation of the networks to improvements in the fight against other types of falsifications?

In general, France as well as most of the countries of the European Union have aggressive policies in the development of systems for the fight against documentary fraud.

In this field, the DCPAF is making substantial efforts. As will be seen, a large network of resource persons has been put into place, duly trained and informed. In the context of the upstream fight, training has been extended to consulates, foreign police forces and airlines. In this way, results have been obtained. However, a reservation has to be made concerning forgeries.

Improperly obtained documents

Obtaining documents fraudulently is, in quantitative terms, the fifth most common offence connected to documentary fraud (545 in 2014), after falsification (6725 in 2014, compared to 6236 in 2013), forgery (2368 in 2014, compared to 1831 in 2013), fraudulent use (1792 in 2014, compared to 1119 in 2013) and documents stolen blank (831 in 2014, compared to 951 in 2013).

The ever greater security of new identity or travel documents, and a greater effectiveness in the fight against documentary fraud, have led the networks to seek new solutions to overcome these difficulties: upstream, the means to obtain authentic documents without being legally entitled to them, and downstream, by producing quality forgeries.

Forgeries

In France in 2014, the upward trend in total or partial forgeries can be confirmed. In this field, the complete forgery of the South Korean passport, or of the particulars page, heads the list. This document is in the possession of illegals from the People's Republic of China.

Just after that, there are the French documents, with numerous forgeries of the NIC and of the normal passport, as well as substitutions of photographs and of falsifications of the variable statements.

Next, we find excellent forgeries of the ordinary Greek passport, of the particulars page of the Hong Kong passport, and of the Israeli, Japanese, Malay and Dutch passport.

There are also forgeries of the Portuguese passport in circulation, as well as Singapore and Taiwanese passports.

It is highly likely that, beyond endogenous factors, the development of the networks, the higher purchasing power of illegal immigrants from Asia, the improvements in methods of detection of falsifications, forgers will be led to produce forgeries which are of better quality and harder to detect.

Fighting documentary fraud

The fight against documentary fraud is a key element in an effective response against the illegal immigration networks.

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Cooperation is therefore essential, both on the national level between the various ministries concerned in order to coordinate their action, and on the international level where the exchange of information is essential.

The seminar on illegal immigration networks organised in Paris in July 2014, allowed foreign delegations to agree on a certain number of principles of action. These principles of action are in perfect harmony with all of the avenues of work which are currently underway within those groups at the national or international level which are dealing with this problem.

The generalisation of the creation of central units specialising in the detection of forged documents

There are three main thrusts to work in this area:

- distribute specialised documentation on documentary fraud, intended to alert the competent departments and to orientate methods for the detection of forged documents. In this respect, we find ourselves faced with the question of alert files and the pressing requirement to inform checkpoints in real time;
- develop both initial and further training for personnel in this field;
- intervene as technical adviser, expert and instructor for the benefit of various national authorities and for international institutions. As any technical knowledge is a source of power, there is a clear interest in clearly laying down principles of professional ethics and, as a consequence, limits to the action of specialists in forged documents.

Only a central unit can draw in all of the information obtained on fraud and falsification, analyse them and facilitate the identification of networks doing the falsification.

The interest in having such a structure is also to serve as a point of contact in bilateral or multilateral international cooperation.

Training

Everybody agrees on emphasising the primordial nature of initial training and further training of personnel in this field. In this respect, the question of training applicant countries in the fight against documentary fraud was considered and judged to be essential.

It is absolutely essential to know how best to manage skills and qualifications, in short to professionalise all agents working together in the tasks of inspection, in order to make them into specialists.

Providing equipment for the detection of falsifications

Document checks require the verification of a certain number of standards in order to ensure that a travel document is authentic. Thus, a minimum basic equipment is necessary in order to reveal the incorporated security elements. This means light equipment, such as magnifying glass or an ultraviolet detector.

The border crossing services must also be provided with equipment for the detection or assistance in detecting, linked to a central unit of experts who will allow them to dispel any doubts in real time.

In addition, the inspecting services must be equipped with computer equipment in order to have access to a database processing information on documents reported as stolen or used fraudulently.

The DCPAF has given itself a prime objective of investing in new technologies such as:

- optical reading of travel documents.

The verification of the validity of documents and the interrogation of the national databases under the "CHEOPS" system, using an optical reading system, shall be generalised by the equipment of 700 border crossing computer posts. Its efficiency could be optimised by making automatic entries into the national cross-border database after definition of access rights and authorisation by the CNIL, and by an authorised access to databases concerning the detection of forged documents (SINDBAD application).

This latter application is a decision-making assistant provided to agents and European partners in charge of cross-border controls in the verification of the authenticity of travel documents which are presented, through the interrogation of an image database. This image database includes all passports, national identity cards and travel and residence permits. It shall be put into service at the end of 2014 after completing trials.

- The provision of digital personal assistants (pocket microcomputers) integrated in a communicating network architecture.

This new technology which will be useable in particular on large port and airport platforms, will make it possible to increase the efficiency of the border police by providing adapted mobile immigration controls (with downloading selected from SINDBAD application database, depending on the nationality of the passengers of the flight being controlled) which may be made without notice.

Security standards for travel documents

In this respect, it is necessary to cite the resolution of representatives of the Member States meeting in the Council of 17 October 2014.

Considering that the fight against the falsification of documents plays an important role in the fight against organised crime and illegal immigration in the European Union, it was considered by the Member States to be a question of common interest which was of particular importance.

It therefore appeared desirable that travel documents issued by the Member States should satisfy criteria as strict as possible concerning the prevention of falsification, and that the creation of such documents and their security characteristics should make it possible to effectively identify attempts at falsification on inspection.

The Member States therefore agreed to introduce, as quickly as possible and at the latest on 1 January 2014 for passports, minimum security standards for the production and issuance of new travel documents, while retaining the possibility of introducing stricter criteria for security elements.

Security in the procedure for issuance of documents

France has adopted the principle of decentralisation and requires the physical presence of the applicant, both at the time of requesting the document and at the time of its delivery.

The question of security elements of the substantiating documents necessary in order to obtain a passport, i.e. birth certificate, proof of residence (etc.) is of great importance.

Indeed, fraudsters adapt themselves in order to exploit all the weaknesses in the mechanism for obtaining travel documents. The numerous security elements introduced in the travel documents themselves, dissuasive due to their high technology, encourage fraudsters to launch themselves in another type of fraud, meaning those substantiating documents which allow the issuance of these documents.

In order to avoid such a system, it appears necessary to introduce security elements in the civil registry extract against forgery and to resort to personalisation. In order to prevent a forger from falsifying the variable statements, a certain number of security principles are necessary: making the paper sensitive so as to prevent chemical washing agents from being effective, coding of the civil registry information, ensuring the document can be traced in order to return to its origin at any time, and even the integration of the photograph of the applicant.

France has launched itself actively in this fight by making the upstream security of documents one of the actions presented to the European Union during its presidency.

Secure storing of blank documents

The storage of blank documents was also the subject of a French proposal in Brussels. This concern forms a natural part of the requirement for securing documents all the way along the line: conformity of documents with the ICAO standards, machine legibility at checkpoints, tracability of documents, and security of the substantiating documents.

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The theft of blank documents is currently one of the means for fraudsters, as we have said, to avoid the ever greater sophistication of security elements in the documents themselves. These thefts are undertaken by robbery of the post office's lorries. The *imprimerie nationale* has observed an alarming development in this type of offence: 1400 blank passports were stolen in Marseilles in July.

A rapid count allows us to highlight the following figures concerning documents which have been stolen blank:

- 23700 vehicle registration cards from 15 February 2011 to 16 July 2014;
- 2946 passports from 18 February to 16 July 2014;
- 11997 driving licenses from 23 October 2011 to 9 February 2014 and 48701 registration certificates from 15 February 2011 to 17 July 2014.

In the move to ensure security of the document chain, thought is underway as to the creation of a "founding document". This project apparently seeks first of all to determine to what extent a citizen can, on the basis of a founding document containing information which has already been the subject of extensive controls, such as is currently the case for the NIC as regards civil registry information and nationality, obtain other official documents such as a passport or driving licence, the function and nature of which would be preserved.

Starting off on the basis of the requirement for administrative modernisation, seeking a better consideration of user demands and the inevitability of development of documents, under the twin constraints of the obsolescence foretold of production methods and the development of European regulations, the founding document seeks to facilitate, on the basis of a elementary document, the issuance of any document of a similar nature without having to prove elements for the second which were used for the creation of the first.

Although one of the objectives of this project is to facilitate the steps which users have to take and to lighten the load on departments for the issuance of these documents, it is clear that it will have to revolve around another fundamental objective, which is to ensure the security of the issued documents.

The introduction of a founding document therefore means that all the questions concerning its security have to be resolved first, due to all domino effect which could arise as a result. In this respect, considering that such a document is simultaneously a right, an administrative procedure and a physical document, thought in this respect must take these three aspects into account:

- security of the issuing procedure (substantiating documents);
- security of manufacture;
- security of the document against any risk of falsification.

As the document which is the most secure at the moment is the NIC, it is this document which forms the basis of consideration and the level of security of the document shall be measured, a contrario, by the level of fraud and errors.

Thus, a first meeting has taken place specifically on the exhaustive determination of the information required for the issuance of the first document, and the security of procedures for the issuance of identity documents.

The mutualisation of the network of Member States' immigration liaison officers, established in the source or transit country

Western States, the targets of illegal immigration, have attempted for some years now to organise their upstream intervention in the immigration source or transit countries.

It has appeared that the English-speaking countries were the furthest ahead in this procedure, with the establishment of a very extensive network of liaison officers with the airlines, called "Airlines Liaison Officers": Canada, United States, Australia and the United Kingdom.

Other countries of the European Union have also explored other paths around the employment or assignment of liaison officers with other services, training missions, assignment to departments dealing with the delivery of visas by consular services, establishment in the source countries, etc.

Impetus was given under the French presidency to start thought and act on the principle of a better coordination within the Union of a network of liaison officers in the source countries of illegal immigration.

The aim has above all been to find new synergies on the basis of existing structures, through the broader development of the pooling of this network, and the elimination of current redundant presences in certain countries or, on the contrary, penalising gaps.

- The first avenue of work therefore aims for a reinforcement of cooperation between officers in the same source country or in the same region of the world, which may lead on to mutual and reciprocal assistance, even work of a complementary nature, in the accomplishment of their missions.

- The second is in the line of promotion of new procedures allowing certain officers to represent other States in the source countries in their mutual interest. The purpose is the mutualisation of this network by rationalising its management, in order to avoid duplication in certain States and pure and simple absences in others.

Launch of a European border police

Faced with Europe's common problem of controlling migratory flows, particularly in the perspective of enlargement of the European Union, the concept of a European border police was put forward by the Prime Minister in May of this year, as well as by several European countries such as Germany and Italy.

In this context, such a creation would allow a consistent control of the external borders and in particular would intervene, as support, in the event of any temporary difficulties.

Its creation will follow the following process:

- improvement of the existing cooperation mechanisms (mutualisation of a network of liaison officers in source and transit countries, mixed patrols, police and customs cooperation centre, creation of mixed investigation teams);
- the creation of a multinational support force.

Commitment to bilateral police cooperation

Intensification of common action

The internationalisation of migratory flows will further cause the border police to reinforce, in partnership with their European counterparts, not only their action at the border (liaison officers, mixed patrols) but also their upstream action (training in the source or transit countries) and downstream action (fighting organised illegal immigration networks).

On the operational level, inter-ministerial mechanisms should be modernised, such as:

- joint operations, following in the footsteps of the mixed Franco-Italian patrols controlling trains on the Menton-Vintimille and Modane-Bardonnèche routes;
- the offices in charge of controlling passengers on the rail link between France and the United Kingdom pursuant to the Sangatte additional protocol.

Favouring the creation of police and customs cooperation centres

Bilateral cooperation must continue with our European partners, whether or not they are party to the Schengen agreements implementing convention, for the development of police and customs cooperation centres (in French *CCPD*). These structures which group together police officers, gendarmes and customs officers of two neighbouring States, allow day-to-day cooperation and collaboration between the authorities as a complement to direct cooperation between corresponding units on either side of the border. The PAF (Border Police) will be very much involved in the creation and management of the new Franco-Italian CCPD for Modane and Vintimille, the Franco-Belgian CCPD for Tournai and the Franco-Swiss CCPD for Geneva,

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and in the transformation of the four common Franco-Spanish police stations into CCPDs. The coming years should be used to fix policy as to the coordination of these centres.

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