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A COMPARATIVE STUDY ON EPISODES OF FINANCIAL TURMOIL: INSIGHTS FROM THE DOTCOM BUBBLE, 2008 CRISIS, AND CRYPTOCURRENCY ERA

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Abstract: *This paper examines the recurring dynamics of financial crises through a comparative case study of the Dotcom bubble, the 2008 global financial crisis, and the ongoing cryptocurrency era. The objective is to investigate whether cryptocurrencies represent a genuine financial revolution or a repetition of past speculative manias. Using a qualitative methodology, the study applies a behavioral finance framework to analyse biases such as herding, overconfidence, and FOMO, and combines this with the evaluation of market data, including IPO trends, interest rates, and volatility indices.*
The results reveal strong equivalents across all three cycles. In each case, investor sentiment amplified volatility, and speculative assets obscured true risk. Weak regulation left markets vulnerable to collapse. Today's ICOs are a reflection of IPOs in the Dotcom bubble, meanwhile the regulatory faults in 2008 find similarities in decentralized finance (DeFi). Moreover, the evidence challenges the Efficient Market Hypothesis, which markets illustrate collective perceptions instead of objective fundamentals. The findings suggest that financial markets repeat inefficiencies in new forms. Cryptocurrencies risk becoming another phase in the history of financial instability without coordinated regulation, investor education, and macroprudential monitoring.
Keywords: *investor sentiment, DeFi, Dotcom bubble, 2008 Financial Crisis, Cryptocurrency*

1 Introduction

Today's finance undoubtedly changes from traditional finance to a new era. The big examples of these are cryptocurrencies and derivatives. People try to learn topics related to the cryptocurrency field and make investment decisions to get capital gain from their trading. In this article we dive deep into the similarities between Dotcom and the 2008 financial crisis and today's cryptocurrency era.

To begin with, the shift in how we perceive and engage with financial systems is becoming more visible with every passing day. What was once dominated by banks and centralised institutions is now being challenged by blockchain-based innovation and decentralised finance. But with every revolution comes the question: Are we genuinely moving forward, or are we circling back to the mistakes of the past? In the late 1900's and beginning of 2000's, two main shocks gave the investing world a great lesson or perhaps not. Twenty-five years ago on Monday, a multiyear US stock rally hit its peak and began a precipitous decline that would wipe 77 percent off the value of the Nasdaq by the time it finally cratered two years later (Fan, Y. 2022). These days, the dotcom bubble has become shorthand for irresponsible enthusiasm for new technology and blind greed.

This historical reference is more than just a case study, it also serves as a warning. The dot-com boom deceived investors with dreams of wealth fueled by innovation, but when the excitement faded and fundamentals failed to support valuations, the collapse was inevitable. This is the kind of irrational optimism we must watch for in today's digital assets.

1.1 Historical Background

After experiencing the dot-com bubble and the 9/11 attacks, the U.S. economy was facing significant uncertainty marked by slowed economic growth. The Federal Reserve drastically lowered interest rates from 6.5% to 1% in early 2001 to early 2003, in hope of encouraging borrowing, investment and spending. This became the direct cause of the radical increase in U.S. mortgage lending as real estate became easier to afford (Wentao Zhang, 2024). Reckless lending led to record numbers of loans in default (Federal Reserve Bank study, 2008). As they are bundled together, the general losses resulted in many financial institutions failing and requiring a governmental bailout.

The outcome was a full-blown financial crisis that shows how policy reactions to one bubble can mistakenly lead to the next crisis. These domino effects reveal the interconnected nature of global finance and how human behavior increases systemic risks. Now the question is: "Are we seeing the same foundation being laid in the crypto world?" Today the consistency in the spreading of cryptocurrency is reminding us of some of these past global shocks' early periods. Since the inception of Bitcoin in 2009, the crypto market has expanded exponentially, and among the hundreds of metrics, the CMC 200 Index stands out as a representative benchmark, capturing the performance of the top 200 cryptocurrencies by market capitalization. The crypto market recently faced a significant crash, which caused anxiety in the market (Solactive, 2019). What were the reasons for this sudden downturn, and what deeper issues lie beneath the surface?

Just like the early days of internet stocks or subprime mortgages, digital assets today enjoy both massive interest and minimal oversight (Floridi, 2024). The rapid expansion in the number of tokens and platforms, many of them built on hype and speculative narratives, makes it difficult to separate real innovation from short-term mania. In the Dotcom bubble, volatility reflected the overvaluation of an imagined digital future. The hidden fragilities of an over-leveraged financial system were masked by an illusion of financial innovation and market confidence in 2008. In today's crypto era, volatility is not only about rapid price changes but also reflects the deeper instability of trust in evolving technologies, unpracticed governance models, and divided global regulation. What we're witnessing is a unification of the conditions, such as psychological exuberance, institutional ignorance, and the lack of regulatory focus that reflect past crises but now operate in a more decentralized and globally interconnected ecosystem. This makes the current financial world particularly vulnerable to systemic shocks. Bitcoin is not the New Gold, it is a comparison of volatility, correlation, and portfolio performance (Klein et al., 2018). The popularity of cryptocurrencies has risen significantly since Nakamoto (2008) introduced the concept of Bitcoin. Cryptocurrencies embody innovative technology, high security architecture, prosperity in functionalities, and investment opportunity as an asset, which makes them attractive for computer scientists, venture capitalists as well as investors. However, the decentralization and unregulated markets add an additional layer of uncertainty to their pricing and projection of application.

1.2. Theoretical Overview

Decentralised finance (DeFi) is an emerging financial system using blockchain and cryptocurrencies that aims to reduce costs and speed up processes (Rakesh, 2025). However, it warrants worry, especially in some developing and emerging countries, which have major risks towards crypto-induced shocks, have active crypto-markets with few regulations. The widening regulatory gap between countries negatively affects the convergence of international financial institutions and standard-setting bodies (Guo & Zhang, 2024). The contradiction between the nature of cryptocurrencies and the regulatory obligations forms a unique dilemma for regulators (Kanu, 2025). Without a unified global framework, countries remain exposed to cross-border financial risks, particularly when speculative booms end in sudden busts. For fragile economies, this could lead to financial disaster. This paper examines the question of "Are we truly standing on the edge of a financial revolution with cryptocurrencies, or are we unknowingly caught in a digital repetition of past financial

manias?". In order to understand and reveal this question, we are going to use the behavioural finance concepts to show the overconfidence and herd behaviour of the market participants with a case study approach. The goal is to determine lessons that remain applicable today, understanding why rational investors often fail to learn from history and how the future of finance may be shaped by such biases.

Some fundamental questions about the validity of the Efficient Market Hypothesis, which assumes that markets always reflect all available information, are also raised with these behavioral inefficiencies. In reality, what markets often reflect is not the objective truth, but collective perception, which is often objectively flawed. As Howard Marks stated: "I believe the market accurately reflects not the truth, which is what the efficient market hypothesis says, but it accurately and efficiently reflects everybody's opinion as to what's true." Ultimately, the lessons of the past are not just history, they are warnings disguised as new digital faces. We've seen bubbles before, and they always look revolutionary until they burst. Whether crypto turns out to be a new era or a digital déjà vu depends on whether the world can finally learn from its own economic storytelling.

2. METHODOLOGY

2.1 Research approach

This study applies a qualitative research method based on content analysis of media reports and literature review to examine the underlying causes and consequences of financial crises, to assess their relevance for today's cryptocurrency markets, and to learn how to avoid similar mistakes in today's world. The focus is on two historical cases, which are the dot-com bubble and the global financial crisis of 2008, because they represent two distinct but influential periods of speculative behaviour and systemic collapse. The idea behind using a qualitative case analysis lies in the nature of the research question. The objective of this study is to analyse patterns, behavioural biases, and institutional dynamics across crises and evaluate how these lessons can be applied to the current crypto boom.

2.2 The role of biases

The Dotcom bubble and the 2008 financial crisis reflect how financial frenzies are not directly about the assets themselves. However, it is about behavioural patterns that distort investor judgment, and some of them also appear in today's cryptocurrency boom (Shiller, 2000). The Dotcom bubble shows how multiple behavioural biases can interact to create unsustainable market euphoria. This could be further proven by the high volatility during that period. As can be inferred from Figure 1, NASDAQ market valuation reached ecstasy levels- approximately 400 points all the way to 4397.84 points during the peak. We can admit these results with a multitude of behavioural biases. Firstly, let's begin with herding behaviour. As investors followed the crowd into internet IPOs, which quickly evolved into a collective fear of missing out (FOMO), a belief that sitting on the sidelines meant losing the opportunity of a lifetime (Hirshleifer, 2001). This urgency was amplified by overconfidence, as both retail investors and analysts convinced themselves that even the simplest association with the internet gives immunity from traditional valuation rules (Ofek & Richardson, 2003).

When early success stories like Amazon or eBay appeared to validate this optimism, sample size neglect set in. A few examples of success were wrongly generalized to other start-ups with unproven business models. This exaggerated belief in innovation and incorrect generalization, which had masked the fragile fundamentals, was revealed with the collapse.

Ten years later, the 2008 financial crisis happened through an interestingly similar sequence of psychological errors. As families and investors bought homes largely because rising prices suggested that "everyone else" was doing the same, the rush into real estate was again driven by herding (Shiller, 2008). This led to normalcy bias, where both lenders and regulators assume that housing prices could only continue climbing in spite of clear warning signs. On Wall Street, the creation of mortgage-backed securities developed an illusion of control. Complex financial engineering was believed to disperse and contain risk, when it only concentrated on vulnerabilities (Gorton, 2010).

Figure 1. *NASDAQ Index (1994-2005)*



Source: Bloomberg Data 07.10.2025

As housing prices continued to increase, overconfidence also started to increase due to financial institutions underestimating the possibility of collapse as illustrated in Figure 2. Similar to Dotcom, sample size neglect also played a role, as a short history of stable mortgage performance was mistaken for proof of long-term security (Kahneman & Tversky, 1974). The crash revealed how the combination of biases had built a false appearance of stability on top of unsound models.

Figure 2. *Case-Shiller Housing Index (2000-2010)*

Case-Shiller Housing Index (2000-2010)



Source: Bloomberg Data 07.10.2025

Today's cryptocurrency boom reflects many of the same behavioral patterns, which are shown through digital finance. The explosive rise of Bitcoin and other tokens has triggered widespread herding, as retail investors ran into exchanges and platforms (Baur et al., 2018). The reason for the surge itself was not derived from proven intrinsic value, instead, it was a sign of credibility. This has given rise to widespread FOMO, since investors feared missing the "next Bitcoin," which drives speculative activity in ICOs, NFTs, and DeFi projects (Ante, 2021). The belief in blockchain technology just guarantees financial revolution mirrors the overconfidence of past eras.

On the other hand, speculative trading strategies reveal a dangerous illusion of control, and it is assumed that risk can be managed in extreme markets with limited oversight. At the same time, a persistent normalcy bias tricks stakeholders, even after repeated crypto crashes. While sample size neglect leads people to believe that short-term surges in token values can reliably forecast long-term sustainability. To sum up, these biases illustrate that the underlying factors remain the same without depending on the form, whether they are internet startups, mortgage securities or digital assets.

2.3 Investor sentiment and volatility

Behavioral biases shape individual decision-making. Their collective outcome is the most visible in the relationship between investor sentiment and market volatility (Thirumala et al., 2023). Investor sentiment during the Dotcom boom reached the highest levels of optimism, as enthusiasm for internet technologies hindered rational assessments of profitability (Ofek & Richardson, 2003). This euphoric sentiment transformed into extreme volatility on Nasdaq. It resulted with rapid surges in valuations, which were often followed by equally sharp corrections due to faltering confidence. In the 2008 financial crisis, sentiment shifted from exuberance in housing markets to sudden fear after mortgage defaults began to rise. Years of comfort were converted to panic. It produced some of the most volatile months in modern financial history.

Figure 3. *IPO Deal Count (1990-2005)*



Source: Bloomberg Data 07.10.2025

As we can infer from Figure 3, the surge of IPO deals between 1999 and 2002 was a result of market euphoria (Loughran & Ritter, 2004). The confidence behind companies with a Dotcom suffix was so strong that every new start-up could have an IPO with just a single website and a deceptive marketing strategy. The rising trend of the Dotcom craze even influenced the decisionmaking of the most prestigious financial institutions. The credibility of established financial institutions, which underwrote these deals reinforced the speculative atmosphere (Ofek & Richardson, 2003). The most notable example would be Amazon.com, where it lost 90% of its share price over a period of 2 years (Rick Dagley, 2013).

To supplement the idea, The Median age of IPOs in the same period was one of the lowest in history (Figure 4). It illustrates the difference between normal market periods versus the Dotcom era. As we can see from above, in the period between 1996 and 2000 the median age of IPOs was less than 4 years, even some companies went public as soon as 16 months into their lives (Michael Ewens, 2020). By contrast, today's IPO landscape reflects a more cautious approach. Now, companies remain private for much longer, with the median age of IPOs exceeding 10 years (Liz Dunshee, 2025).

Figure 4. *Median age of IPOs*



Source: Michael Ewens (2020)

Overall, these patterns emphasize how the Dotcom IPO boom was not only about inflated valuations but also about the fast entry into public markets. Deal counts rose as capital flooded into amateur firms. The immaturity of companies that are going public illustrated how investor sentiment dictated market behaviour rather than fundamentals. When the bubble collapsed, the rapid decline in deal volume mirrored the loss of confidence. It shows how IPOs can serve as an indicator for speculative excess during financial uncertainty. This link between sentiment, immaturity, and volatility is not unique to the Dotcom period but has recurred in later financial manias, especially in the cryptocurrency markets (Ofek & Richardson, 2003).

In today's cryptocurrency markets, sentiment is even more volatile, which is amplified by the dominance of retail participation and the lack of regulatory structures. Technological milestones or high-profile endorsements enhanced periods of optimism (Baur, Hong, & Lee, 2018). Asset prices soar because of those periods. Conversely, regulatory announcements or security breaches can trigger significant downturns swiftly (Guo & Zhang, 2024). The evidence from these cases claims that investor sentiment acts as a powerful factor. When it turns positive, it boosts growth far beyond fundamentals, and when it turns negative, it causes rapid collapse. Therefore, volatility is not a byproduct but a crucial feature of financial manias that reflects the fragile foundation of confidence in speculative markets. In this respect, the Dotcom IPO wave and the cryptocurrency boom are not separate stories, but chapters of the same book.

The IPO frenzy of the Dotcom era is quite similar to the surge of initial coin offerings (ICOs) and token launches in cryptocurrency markets (Ofir, 2020). It is the same in a sense that internet startups in the late 1990s were able to attract capital with little more than a business plan and a website, many crypto projects have secured funding based on little more than a white paper and speculative promises of technological disruption. The short maturity of Dotcom IPO firms, which are often just a few years old, mirrors the fast nature of ICOs. It leads to concerns about sustainability and long-term value. In both cases, public markets overflowed with hollow projects, which strengthened volatility. If we can compare the Dotcom IPO boom with the rise of ICOs, it becomes clear that speculative capital markets repeat themselves under different names. Thus, when we view them together, IPOs and ICOs serve as parallel expressions that repeatedly sacrifice stability for the promise of rapid growth.

2.4 The impact of Regulation and applications on DeFi

While both the Dotcom bubble and the cryptocurrency boom highlight the threats of unchecked market enthusiasm, the 2008 global financial crisis revealed a different dimension of instability. It showed the systemic consequences of insufficient regulation. Before the crisis, innovation of mortgage-backed securities and complex derivatives exceeded the capacity of regulators to supervise (Barberis, 2012). Although risk was dispersed in theory, it was concentrated in practice. As a result, financial institutions and investors were exposed to high risk. As the chart of U.S. Federal Reserve interest rates shows, monetary policy further magnified these dynamics. The extreme reduction of rates from 6.5% in 2001 to nearly 1% by 2003 created a rush in mortgage lending (Figure 5). Subsequently, the increases prior to 2007 added stress to a fragile housing market (Congressional Research Service, 2009). When defaults began to rise, the lack of effective safeguards caused the collapse. The regulatory gap of 2008 forced governments into bailouts to stabilise the system. The lessons from the crisis helped us to shape how we think about financial oversight today and the test of regulatory effectiveness on new innovations.

Figure 5. *US FED Funds Interest Rate*

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

Source: Bloomberg Data 07.10.2025

Today's decentralised finance (DeFi) environment repeats many of these vulnerabilities in a new technological form. Whereas the period of 2008 demonstrated the dangers of excessive faith in financial engineering within a regulated system, DeFi represents the complete opposite. It represents an intentionally unregulated system of innovations that remains unchecked. DeFi operates outside traditional oversight, which offers innovation and accessibility, but also invites fragility. It shares similarities with the 2008 crisis due to regulatory gaps and monetary policy that creates systemic risk. In addition, crypto markets follow U.S. monetary conditions as well. Rising interest rates resulted in big downturns. This is clearly reflected in the BGCI Index (Figure 6), which shows sharp peaks in 2021 followed by steep declines as liquidity conditions tightened. Each subsequent rally and correction mirrors a shift in global monetary policy, which demonstrates that sentiment-driven crypto assets are highly sensitive to external shocks. This process emphasises how decentralised systems are affected by global liquidity cycles. We see that markets are left vulnerable to major failures without appropriate measures. It points to the constant tension between innovation, speculation, and regulation. These weaknesses also provide a significant perspective for questioning broader financial theories. When we think about constant market failures because of either regulatory gaps, investor sentiment, or policy shifts, they force us to think about the overall effectiveness of financial theory (Naifar, 2025).

Figure 6. *Bloomberg Galaxy Crypto Index*

Bloomberg Galaxy Crypto



Source: BloombergData 07.10.2025

2.5 The Efficient Market Hypothesis

The Efficient Market Hypothesis (EMH) assumes that asset prices fully and rationally reflect all available information. Nevertheless, the historical record of the previous crises and today's cryptocurrency era provides a compelling counterargument. The Dotcom IPO frenzy showed that markets rewarded immature firms based on hype instead of fundamentals (Ofek & Richardson, 2003). On the other hand, the 2008 collapse revealed how financial instruments caused systemic risk in spite of abundant data. In the crypto era, volatility in indexes like the BGCI indicates that prices respond to shifting sentiment and regulatory uncertainty rather than to intrinsic value (Naifar, 2025). We repeatedly saw that markets often showed not the actual value but just the projection of the market sentiment. As Warren Buffett says, "When the price of a stock can be influenced by a 'herd' on Wall Street with prices set at the margin by the most emotional person, or the greediest person, or the most depressed person, it is hard to argue that the market always prices rationally. In fact, market prices are frequently nonsensical."

These patterns affirm that financial markets are not neutral mechanisms of efficiency. However, recurring inefficient markets, where speculation and incomplete information push cycles of boom and bust.

2.6 The role of media and reports

The role of the news media in the stock market is not a simple tool for investors who are reacting to economically important news, meanwhile, the media actively shapes public attention and sentiment (Shiller, 2000). A notable example of this phenomenon occurred in December 1996, when former Chairman of the Federal Reserve Board Alan Greenspan introduced the famous phrase of 'irrational exuberance' during a speech at the height of the dot-com bubble. His warning to the market participants that stock markets might be overvalued reflected growing concerns about speculative excess (Jorion, 2009). Later, this phrase was inspired by Yale professor Robert J. Shiller, which became a central theme in Shiller's 2000 book "Irrational Exuberance" (Shiller, 2000) He described these bubbles as less driven by fundamentals, but more by psychological contagion. News of rising prices stimulates interest, boosted by stories of easy wealth, and attracts a wider audience despite doubts about real value. This standard was evident in the dot-com era, when internet-based companies with little or no profits were going up to massive valuations before collapsing. Shiller's insights also reached their peak in the 2008 Global Financial Crisis. Overinflated housing prices powered by media hype and investor overconfidence, subsequently crashed and triggered a global economic downturn. The same thing is visible today in the cryptocurrency market, where media attention and online communities enhance rapid price increases, attracting new investors who are motivated by both fear of missing out and the allure of quick profits. Most of the time, these emotional extremes are developed

through the Crypto Fear and Greed Index. This index uses data and sentiment graphs in order to track whether the market is dominated by optimism and overconfidence (greed) or anxiety and risk aversion (fear) (Alternative.me, n.d.). Similarly in previous bubbles, such indicators support Shiller's opinion that investor psychology continues to drive asset valuations, and it raises questions about whether today's crypto boom represents sustainable growth or another case of irrational exuberance.

3. RESULTS

In this section, we present the findings of our comparative study across three major cycles of financial instability, which are the Dotcom bubble, the 2008 financial crisis, and the ongoing cryptocurrency era.

From Table 1 we can observe recurring dynamics of speculation with the help of analysing investor sentiment, behavioural biases, regulatory conditions, and monetary policy. They have structural similarities. However, each crisis is distinct in its instruments: internet IPOs, mortgage-backed securities, or decentralised tokens.

Crypto markets can be characterised as highly volatile with accompanying boom and bust cycles. A lack of stringent regulatory frameworks promotes opportunistic behaviour among investors. As regards investor sentiment, periods of dotcom bubble and 2008 GFC are characterised by optimistic approach and overconfidence. The crypto markets, on the other hand, demonstrate volatile optimism affected by many factors such as decentralised flow of information and loss aversion.

Compared to the Dot-Com Bubble and the 2008 Global Financial Crisis, which made equities in tech companies and real estate the primary asset classes, the current crypto market represents digital assets, such as tokens, as the main asset class.

When it comes to the response of monetary policy across periods, the Fed did not implement any significant action to overcome the Dotcom Bubble and kept interest rates at low level; however, in the 2008 Global Financial Crisis, we observed a comprehensive intervention in the form of quantitative easing and bailouts. For the cryptocurrency era, in general we find out the mixed responses across the countries. Some central banks decide to launch digital forms of national currency while others prefer to keep a close eye on monitoring existing systemic risk. The Fed is also assessing and exploring the implications of establishing central bank digital currencies (CBDC). Despite the potential range of benefits, such as improvement in efficiency, some risks can be imposed on credit markets. Besides that, cryptocurrencies have not been widely used means of payment in the United States (Federal Reserve System, 2022).

Table 1. *Results of comparative content analysis*

Dimension	Dotcom Bubble (1995–2002)	2008 Financial Crisis	Cryptocurrency Era (2009–Present)
Primary Asset Class	Internet stocks / IPOs	Mortgage-backed securities, housing	Cryptocurrencies, ICOs, DeFi tokens
Investor Sentiment	Optimism around internet IPOs	Confidence in perpetual housing growth	Volatile optimism tied to tech milestones, fear of regulation
Behavioural Drivers	Herding, FOMO, overconfidence	Normalcy bias, illusion of control, overconfidence	Herding, FOMO, overconfidence, normalcy bias
Market Characteristics	IPO surge, immature firms, Nasdaq −77%	Housing boom, mortgage surge, record volatility	Sharp peaks and crashes in CMC 200 / BGCI
Role of Regulation	Limited IPO oversight	Weak mortgage/derivative oversight; post-crisis reforms	Minimal oversight; fragmented regulation
Monetary Policy Impact	Interest rate cuts, fostered liquidity	Low rates (2001–2003), later hikes stressed system	Crypto downturns linked to Fed tightening cycles
Collapse Trigger	Overvaluation, weak firms	Rising defaults, securitization failures	Regulatory crackdowns, liquidity tightening
Aftermath / Lessons	Collapse of most Dotcoms	Global crisis; bailouts, reforms	Volatility persists; risks unresolved

4. DISCUSSION

The comparative analysis of the Dotcom bubble, the 2008 financial crisis, and the cryptocurrency era focuses on repeating patterns in financial instability. As we mentioned above, the common features of these crises are repetition of human behavior instead of the specific form of the asset. History's lessons continue to reflect in today's financial landscape by linking these elements.

4.1 Key Lessons

First of all, investor psychology is in the core position between the indicators. Herd behavior and FOMO continue to fuel speculative surges from Dotcom IPOs and mortgage-backed securities to ICOs and meme tokens. Overconfidence and normalcy bias prevent rational assessment of risk, whereas the illusion of control instils false confidence into fragile systems.

Second, financialisation obscures true risk. In 2008, complex instruments created an illusion of safety. Today's innovation is often aligned with tokens, DeFi platforms, and new crypto derivatives, but they can mask hidden risks. Volatility and collapses reveal how risk was just renamed rather than eliminated. This consistency demonstrates how each new financial innovation is a risky vehicle for the same vulnerabilities. Such inefficiencies underscore why regulation became a decisive factor in forming market stability.

4.2 Regulatory Solutions

Several countries started to apply different strategies to manage crypto-related risks. Azerbaijan has introduced taxation on cryptocurrency earnings, which treats them in the same way as other forms of capital gains in order to generate revenue (Tax Code of the Republic of Azerbaijan, 2025). It helps to discourage excessive speculation. This was one of the first regional attempts to bring crypto under conventional tax structures. In the United States, crypto transactions are subject to capital gains tax. Since 2024, new IRS reporting requirements have further tightened oversight of exchanges (IRS / Treasury press releases, 2023). In addition, the European Union has launched its MiCA (Markets in Crypto-Assets Regulation) framework. MiCA represents one of the first attempts to create a comprehensive regional framework (Hogan Lovells, 2023). In India, the government has imposed a 30% tax on crypto income and a 1% tax deducted at source (TDS) on transactions (Lexology / Chase Advisors, 2023). These examples collectively demonstrate that taxation and oversight can help limit speculation, but they also reveal the shortcomings of individual national responses in a global market. This makes international coordination critical if we want the regulation to succeed in decreasing systemic risk.

4.3 Avoiding Future Crises

Building on these lessons, we can assume several steps that are essential to avoid another systemic collapse. Regulation needs to reach a balance with global standards for crypto assets, where the protection of crypto investors' risks and financial innovation do not limit each other. Additionally, investor education is needed to counter the psychological roots of bubbles. We need to raise awareness of biases such as herding and FOMO that repeatedly alter the decision-making of investors. Finally, macroprudential monitoring should be strengthened. It is a necessity to recognize that liquidity cycles and monetary policies have powerful influence on speculative assets like cryptocurrencies. In general, these measures emphasize that avoiding future crises requires a multi-layered approach. Ideally, this process will be finished with integrating regulation, education, and policy oversight into a coherent framework.

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